An integrated theoretical framework for ideological production analysis is developed here to The proliferation of digital intermediation platforms occurs in diverse fields: cultural crowdfunding and crowdsourcing, content aggregation, advertising and marketing, on-line dating, car-pooling, ethical commerce, alternative finance, to name a few. Distribution, information and transaction occur in multi-sided markets, capturing positive externalities produced by the interactions of a multitude of players, including the tech giants which often,
true to type, are not even producing contents, goods or services of their own. As result, the evolution of labour has also been extensively theorised: the differences between audience labour (Smythe 1977) , cultural labour (Hesmondhalgh 2010) , digital labour (Peters and Bulut 2011; Scholz 2013; Fuchs, 2014; Cardon and Casili 2015) , algorithmic labour and platform labour (Andrejevic, 2009; Comor 2010; van Doorn 2017) . In short, the move from audience labour to digital labour to platform labour, forces the subjects to move from viewers viewing and consuming advertising, to users/prosumers engaging in "produsage" (term coined by Bruns, 2007) through playbour, consuming targeted advertising using them as products on social media sites, to workers selling their labour in the gig economy on platforms, whilst social protection becomes a thing of the past (see Gandini's forthcoming for a detailed formulation on the evolution of the scholarship). Platforms are no longer merely cultural intermediares (Matthews and Smith Maguire 2014) , but play on all tables: dead labour, intellectual labour, manual labour, audience, algorithmic and platform labour.
Activities regarding the organisation of labour occurs on three levels (for example in cultural crowdfunding): within their own structures; filtering and editing contents, linking projects to external partners, often resorting to traditional forms of exploitation of cultural labour; stimulating audience labour on external networks (Matthews 2017) . Crowdfunding and crowdsourcing platforms are producers of ideological discourses, busy promoting their shortterm agendas, producing the illusion of modified relations of production and of an inversion of the production cycle. Crucially, platforms use and ideologically justify soft algorithmic control (on Uber, see Rosenblat and Stark, 2016 ; on the food delivery sector see Shapiro 2017) to overcome the inherent spatial and temporal barriers to supervision. Wood et al. (2018a) argue that this leads to exploitation in the form of low pay, overwork, sleep deprivation and exhaustion, with workers organising collectively to combat their current structural conditions, both by creating more platforms to do so, and finding refuge to traditional forms of labour organisation (Wood et al. 2018b; Johnston and Land-Kazlauskas, 2018) .
In this respect, we argue that ideological production is emerging within socio-technical systems and is affecting and being affected directly by those very same. A study that supports this assertion is Ong and Cabañes' (2018) research on the motivations and strategies of a well organised and funded hierarchy of political operators in the Philippines, who maintain day jobs as advertising and public relations executives, computer programmers and political administrative staff, but they recruit a team of anonymous freelance digital influencers and fake account operators to seed core campaign messages in online spaces and create "illusions of engagement" to inspire enthusiasm from real supporters. Amongst their motivation is a selfstyled moral justification of "agent of social change" against dominant structures.
The paradox of the clashing rhetoric and reality of the "sharing economy" (Codagnone et al. 2018) , defined simultaneously as part of capitalist production, but also an alternative to it, is complicated further by the fact that much contemporary research into the political economy of platformisation relies on platforms' own data, and has been produced by platforms themselves, or in dependent collaboration with, due to the proprietary attitude platforms have about the data they collect. Meanwhile, the platform ownders rely on future regulatory decisions, which are set to be fought in parliaments, in courts and on the streets. Despite the obvious differentiation between large privately owned "gig economy" platforms and smaller cooperativist style community-oriented platforms and the various in-between modalities, the management of internal and external labour is not a mere exercise in producing value, as it not only affects structural conditions cutting across industrial sectors, but it also produces particular ideological and cultural discourses, currently involving the recuperation of the "commons", used as what Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) call a "moral justification register".
For the purpose of ideological production analysis (IPA for short) on platforms, we explain key debates in the sharing economy from three sets of literature: critical economy of platformisation, digital labour organisation and gig work, as well as digital activism scholarship. Drawing from these debates across diverse sets of scholarship provides us theoretically with the analytical tools to launch our enquiry. First, in respect to critical economy of platformisation scholarship, we wanted to know whether there is a common language among platform players with regard to "the commons", "open", "collaborative" and so on, or an oscillation between different varieties/iterations of capitalism with a "sharing" "commons"
"cooperativism" justification register. Second, in respect to the digital cultural economies literature, we were eager to see whether they are expanding ideological production beyond former culture industries and whether this is superficial or substantial. Third, in respect to the digital labour organisation and gig work, we examined what are the new cultural forms of relations of production the participants advocate, what relations of production have allowed this product/service they have produced to exist; whether the participant's answer simply served to legitimise their operations as ethical and/or politically radical, or if they were actually engaged in redesigning real labour processes and in what ways. Fourth, in respect to digital activism scholarship what kind of social relations do they legitimise, oppose or resist; what forms of labour the participants are engaging in and how they talk about their labour in terms of ideology (superstructural attributes) and structure (what are they potentially changing as actors in terms of economic value and cultural form?). Lastly, at the heart of our research questions, was the aim to understand how participants articulate these two realms (ideology and structure) and how these interact in the participants' view of their work individually and within their organisation, in order to verify whether Garnham's (1979) hypothesis is confirmed, i.e. that the more autonomous a cultural form is with regard to the social form and the relations of production themselves, the less effective it is.
In what follows, we demonstrate how an integrated framework stemming from the three sets of literature points to our research questions. Then, we explain the methodological approach, from which we launch three analytical sections, each examining one core ideological strand stemming from "sharing economy", "commons", and "platform cooperativism" discourses, supported by fieldwork interviews, oberservation, and document-based evidence. We conclude with core findings and openings for further investigation.
Cross-fertilization of three sets of scholarship for the purpose of IPA on platforms
In the first analytical section, we probe deeper both into the ideological production and the aggressive strategies of intermediary players operating within what Kenney and Zysman (2016) identify as privately generated platform-based "ecosystems", companies which fundamentally "are not delivering technology to their customers and clients-they use technology to deliver labour to them" (Smith and Leberstein 2015, 3) . In turn, Berg (2016, 18) points out that platforms are not regulated by governments, but "this does not mean that they are not regulated, or that it is a free exchange of services between independent parties. Rather, the platforms regulate the market. In fact, the platforms have a position "like that of the government". The context of these platform wars is the following dystopia, whereby the "bargaining power of workers is undermined by the size and scope of the global market for labour; the anonymity that the digital medium affords is a double-edged sword, facilitating some types of economic inclusion, but also allowing employers to discriminate at will; disintermediation is occurring in some instances, but the combination of the existence of a large pool of people willing to work for extremely low wages and the effects of the importance of rating and ranking systems, is also encouraging enterprising individuals to create highly mediated chains" (Graham, Hjorth and Lehdonvirta 2017, 16 ).
What's more, we know from the iLabour index developed by Kässi and Lehdonvirta (2016) that despite the fact that "it is the information technology industry in each country that is currently making use of online labour", "physical location of the contractors affects the contractors' earnings outcomes through the outside options in local labour markets faced by the contractors" (Kässi et al. 2016, 6) . Workers are also integrated within virtual production networks, and show that "while virtual product is embedded within networks and territories at various spatial scales, it is nevertheless, simultaneously marked by high levels of societal disembeddedness" (Wood et al. 2016, 8) . Lehdonvirta (2016, 14) points to the tension between placelessness and organizational identity, "where the means that are used to delocalize work -deskilling, codification, black boxing, algorithmic management -also undermine organizational identities". As De Stefano (2016, 10) points out "the possibility of being easily terminated via a simple deactivation or exclusion from a platform or app may magnify the fear of retaliation that can be associated to non-standard forms of work, in particular temporary ones". In a similar vein is the pessimism of Valenduc and Vendramin (2016, 41 cite Degryse 2016 ) who feel it is hard to see a future for traditional working relationships in a world where digital platforms act as labour market intermediaries, but "possible lines of action are taking shape in the form of new trade union models, both on and offline." Benson et al. (2015, 23) view traditional labour unions and professional associations used for coordinating collective withdrawal of trade in order to discipline employers giving way to "the rise of new institutions that facilitate information sharing [and] may be taking up some of this role". Accordingly, in the second and third analytical sections, we investigate ideological production of alternatives, commons and platform cooperativism respectively, in terms of digital labour resistance and new possible lines of action. Here, the "commons", for instance see Le
Crosnier's work on the "biens communs" (2015) and Fuster Morell's theorisation of Catalan "procomuns" (2018) are relevant in the European context we investigated, and it is a too common ideological product in the actors we interviewed in Barcelona, Paris, and Berlin.
Besides the commons, there is considerable parallel influence from Scholz and Schneider's (2017) efforts under the banner of "platform cooperativism". This is an emerging network of cooperative developers, entrepreneurs, labour organisers and scholars developing an economic "ecosystem" that seeks to align the ownership and governance of enterprises with the people whose lives are most affected by them. This represents a radical critique of the existing online economy, but it is also a field of experimentation for alternative forms of ownership design. As all sharing economy scholars tend to point out, actions through these platforms, tend to suffer from some of the typical problems of online activism, such as the obvious co-optation or crackdown by government or corporate actors, effects of surveillance, oligopoly and corporatisation, reproduction of hierarchical and exclusionary systems and discourses, affective polarisation, flash in the pan mobilisations, and the issue of sustainability of movements, to name but a few. Here we draw from the strands made in the scholarship on digital activism (Rheingold 1994 Karatzogianni, 2006 Karatzogianni, , 2015 Chadwick 2006; Dahlberg and Siapera 2007; Brevini et al. 2013; Milan 2013; Trottier and Fuchs 2014; Gerbaudo 2014) . Particularly for our analyses, we are taking into account recent contributions made by Dolata (2017) Schrape (2017) and Dolata and Schrape (2016, 9) and their concept of advanced technical sociality: "the institutionalization of the collective can today no longer be represented as a purely social but only as a socio-technical process, understood as the systematic interweaving of social and technical organization and structuring services the interplay of which, however, varies greatly from case to case".
The third set of literature we draw from is broader digital political economy, in the areas of internet governance and oligopoly (Loader 1998; Lessig 1999; Terranova 2000; Castells 2000; Benkler 2006; Jenkins 2006; Scholz 2013; Smyrnaios 2018 ) and critical analyses of culture industries in relation to the "collaborative economy" (Bouquillion and Matthews 2010; Matthews 2016; Nixon 2014 Nixon , 2017 Pais et al. 2018) . A significant element of this theoretical subset is its concern for the questions of labour organisation and relations of production within the traditional culture industries, and that of their evolution at the current intersection of these industries with digital intermediation platforms. Beyond that, important insights have been provided by scholars such as Arvidsson (2018, 289) , who argues that the sharing economy can be empirically understood as "instances of peer production attempting to 'come to market' via the use of a common 'sharing fiction', whereby "we can conceptualize differentials in economic power within the sharing economy in terms of the work that goes into the reproduction of this sharing fiction and the ability to capitalize on it in terms of price differentials". In relation to the innovation vs. social justice debate in platformisation politics (see Dencik et al. 2016) , the promise of "objective governance" through appeals to the magic of algorithms (search, coordination and transaction cost reduction) has so far failed to deliver increased employment and enhanced productivity, whilst new labour laws are radicalising workers across the globe, struggling against unsustainable capital accumulation relied upon unicorn notions of an environmentally conscious circular economy.
Methodology: in-depth interviews, participant observation, secondary document analysis.
To get more theoretical leverage, we draw empirical attention to the rhetorical foundations of the "sharing economy" and the effect of ideological variants on the formations of diverse models, organizations and modes of production in the network economy, by analysing the We interviewed 28 actors from varied institutional settings, from platforms representatives (such as Uber, Airbnb and crowdfunding sites), sharing economy watchdogs, to platform cooperativists, public players, commons-oriented alternative governance groups, as well as digital activists and artists. The study was a joint investigation, "Foundations, discourses and limits of the collaborative economy: an exploratory research", bringing together and extending two projects: Karatzogianni's ESRC project 'The Common Good: Ethics and Rights in Cybersecurity' (project between University of Leicester and University of Hull) and Matthews' research on the "collaborative economy" within the Collab research group at CEMTI (Paris 8 University). During data collection, we explained to the participants the purpose of the research and the interview process, and their right to withdraw at any time. The interviews were semistructured, participants ranged between the ages of 25 and 60, and all had higher education qualifications. what kind of contribution we can provide. The only way to make sure something is going to change, is to get a lot of people into it."
The "conversation" with political players and public authorities, as well as allegedly outdated regulations are also burning issues for the Airbnb public policy representative for the Iberic peninsula (Participant 27, November 2016): "What we have found challenging since we started is that Catalan regional regulations have been designed in a way that corresponds more to regular, not particularly progressive development, of old professional tourism regulations and which are applied to the new rule of the 'prosumer', this citizen who becomes both customer and producer." The old-fashioned approach to tourism and the electoral calendar have not been useful, he argues. The "conversation" has become more complicated with tourism as a hot topic during elections. He claims: "The conversation with the city officials in other cities is taking place in a longer perspective, in a more relaxed environment, where the policy makers can develop the agenda and work together, identifying the kind of users' model experiences we want to promote together, whereas in Barcelona, from the very beginning, it has been very difficult from a purely political point of view. Definitely, these political balances are preventing innovation, by not allowing a reasonable relaxed playing field for policy makers, officials, or ourselves".
The Airbnb representative understands the dominant players in Barcelona as three big groups which are: firstly, the main telecom operators and large corporate groups; secondly a powerful start-up community; and thirdly, movements promoted by the city hall: cooperatives, social economy, commons players. He believes that city funding of these new players is more relevant than the funding of the start-up community: "They have their own lives, their own apps: they don't depend at all on public funding". We questioned his opinions regarding opposition from left-wing political players, and in particular representatives of the commons movement, and in that respect, whether he sees himself as part of the collaborative economy:
We've…noticed that, at times, the left-wing movements in Barcelona don't reflect on the positive impact that the sharing economy has for the little guy, for families, for middle class people who really have an opportunity to get an extra for themselves.
Sometimes it's just too ideological.
Here in Barcelona, unless the sharing economy is based on the pro-commons movement or the cooperative movement, it doesn't exist;
we close the door, we don't want to listen anything about that and it becomes so ideological as well and so reluctant to innovation in a broader perspective.
With the regulation issue for newcomers in the "sharing economy" in Barcelona identified as a core discussion point, we interviewed three officers at the Catalan Competition Authority (Participants 23, 24, 25, Novemeber 2016) to investigate further their approaches and recommendations in relation to these players. This is a publicly funded anti-trust body covering two fields: competition law and promotion of competition. The authority studies firms in terms of their undertakings and examines regulation from the municipality, regional and national governments, but are only responsible for Catalonia (the Spanish competition authority being in charge of broader cases and issues and also answering to the E.U.). The "sharing economy"
cases they have engaged with regarded both legal aspects and the promotion of free trade. We interviewed three officials and their criticism echoes the concerns raised by both Uber and Airbnb representatives: previous regulations aren't fit for these new players. An officer we interviewed from this unit suggests that a lot of innovation is needed to change regulations (Participant 23).
Here we asked about a specific episode when Barcelona mayor Ada Colau used her powers in order to temporarily restrict the tourism market and review its development (the municipality ceased delivering new licenses for rooms within the city centre and for non-sustainable accommodation in the periphery). At this time, the Competition Authority published a report making recommendations based on transferable licenses and openly criticising the move: "By not giving any more licenses for four years, you are not allowing anyone entering the market, so in a way authorisation itself becomes an asset" (Participant 25) . When asked whether they are frustrated with the local government, the director general replied, most diplomatically: "We are waiting; there is no frustration; we understand things go slowly. There is a working commission for the sharing economy; they are analysing how the regulation should be modified we are happy about that. It could work faster but ok" (Participant 24). When we pushed to understand more of the ideological tenets of their organisation (i.e. if they see themselves as politically neutral, as a public service, etc) the response was: "The more companies we have on the market, the better it is, because the prices are lower, we have a better quality, more innovation". We put forward to them that if their default position is free competition, this is already an ideological position, to which we got the astounding answer: "Yes" (Participant 23).
In dominant sharing economy actors and governmental regulation, ideological production draws heavily from a pervasive neo-liberal position "the free-hand of the market takes care of itself" and "get enough people on your network, everything is going to be ok". In the next section, we investigate the "commons" ideological spectrum as one of the competing ideological productions.
Against, with and beyond state and capital: commons discourses, multifarious and paradoxical
The notion of commons and commons-oriented production was "spontaneously" present in over two thirds of the interviews we conducted and we focused on this specific element of ideological production in the discourses of all our interviewees. The first illustration of this comes from the interview we had with a representative of Goteo, a Barcelona based crowdfunding platform (which happens to be promoted by the municipality), at "Cultura Viva", an event we attended in March 2016. Goteo claims to be dedicated to providing funding for projects that are both commons-oriented, socially inclusive and sustainable. We interviewed a problems. We realised that if the international financial elites want to act on a country, on a network, on a system and take decisions on the financial level, then any kind of platform reaches its limits". Indeed, the Goteo team had not faced the problem of capital controls before.
Regarding this, he argues: "There is need of political organisation to put pressure, as nothing can go on, if there is not a political body that functions off the cloud, and doesn't depend on the cloud, knowing how to apply pressure to power structures" (Partcipant 17).
This experienced activist and crowdfunding user goes on to express what he considers as one of the key problems with crowdfunding: "Collaborative economy projects (...) are more and more re-appropriated by private institutions not only as methods and as crowds, as money finally, but also as linguistic, semantic structures. For instance, (...) three days ago, I received an email from a big, private cultural organisation in Athens [which is] very aggressive, aggressive to public space. I mean that they are doing a crowdfunding campaign to finance one of their projects. And, they use the same language, the same vocabulary that we used for our crowdfunding campaign. It could be even 'copy-paste'. I don't mean by that they copy-paste me or our campaign. But, they copy-paste the movement the same way that Syriza in government copy-pasted the slogans [used on] Syntagma Square five years ago." (Participant 17).
A commons activist we interviewed in Paris in April 2016 (Participant 12), during the Nuit Debout mobilisations at Place de République, understands the commons, not only as collective action, but as resource: "You have to act for the commons, but the common pool resource might be something you build, but it can also be something that is global and universal, but you have to transform it from public to common. Something that nobody owns [is] universal; it becomes common when people try to come together to defend it". He seizes the example of Parisian mayor Anne Hidalgo's condemnation of Nuit Debout allegedly "privatising the public space"
by their occupation of Place de la République; "In fact, they are not privatising, they are transforming the public domain, the public space, into a commons, by their activity in the commons". He goes on to ask: "How can we have a new partnership between the state and the commons?" In the section that follows, we conduct an ideological production analysis on the analytical set of platform cooperativism, as the third ideological strand under examination.
And in the name of platform cooperativism
We interviewed a collaborative ecosystem actor, who also acts as representative for Ouishare, 
Conclusion
The drive towards platformisation has gained significant impetus over the past decade. It does however remain a contradictory process, giving rise to significant resistance from both manual and intellectual labour, however poorly organised this remains as yet. As an opening remark, we acknowledge that although our study provides some insight, it does not allow to fully validate Garnham's hypothesis of a higher effectivity of less autonomous ideological forms. It does however offer support for this proposition and expands it, in at least three respects.
First, we note the importance of ideological production for the players we interviewed. One can argue that this is their main activity, as well as setting up and running instruments for transaction and organisation of labour. One key element we find in all discourses is the imprecision and confusion of the ideological forms produced and in particular forms (models and terms) used to describe relations of production. Simultaneously, all these platforms are at least partly dependent on commodity exchange; labour remains commodified, and none of our interviewees propose yet of any form of coherent plan to effectively transform relations of production. In fact, the ideological interchangeability displayed by these actors has an objective basis in material production, and that we can see from our interviews that they are in a position of relative dominance, in comparison to the wider mass of network and platform users, and in particular to manual labourers whose activity is organised via these "tools". Dolata interestingly writes: "The activists and participants of this type of movement are recruited from the pool of well-educated, dissatisfied and online-savvy young people of the urban middle class. Their self-understanding is characterized by a deep skepticism of the classic forms of organizing and the propagation of informal, non-hierarchical and non-ideological structures" (Dolata 2017, 19) . Indeed, the dissatisfaction with "what they did before" is palpable in many
interviews, yet one might wish to critically question the assertion that such players are "welleducated" considering that contemporary university's function "as the training ground for cognitive capitalism's immaterial labourers" (Dowling 2011, 195) . Furthermore, this proposal could be improved by substituting "deep skepticism" for "deep ignorance" (of the classic forms of organising), and replacing "the propagation of informal, non-hierarchical and nonideological structures" by "the propagation of an ideological vision of informal, nonhierarchical structures."
Second, these players are also heavily involved in setting up new socio-technical apparatuses,
which are both what they talk about, what they "agitate" for and what allows them to capture rent -however scarce -from processes of exploitation of labour. They are, from a material point of view, dependent on these apparatus / platforms in order to survive in their current condition. Setting up, running platforms, and spending a large proportion of one's labour time in agitation is paramount for this individual survival, but it serves a goal which is much wider than simply allowing either individual, or even that of wider social groups ("commons-oriented digital activists"; "the collaborative ecosystem"): our hypothesis is that these players are in a sense inadvertedly (in Marx's own term "involuntary promotion") serving what Nixon calls "communicative capital". Nixon (2017) talks of a class relationship, and therefore of class struggle between capitalists ("communicative" or belonging to other factions) and labour (whether "audience" labour or traditional forms of labour, cultural, digital, platform or otherwise, see previous discussion in literature review).
Nevertheless, Nixon's sharp antagonism misses the intermediary nature of these actors which adhere more to Ernst Fischer's explanation of Marx's (1996, Along this line, Alain Bihr (1989) talks of a third, intermediary class "between" capital and labour, or between capitalists and the working class, which he calls "capitalist encadrement class" and mobilising both classical marxist theory and Bourdieu's (1986) analytical framework, set out to consider class according to four linked criteria (composition and quantity of income, position with regard to relations of production, social and cultural practices, in both professional/productive or private/"non-productive" contexts, habitus / class consciousness). It is important to take into account the polysemy of the notion of encadrement, the French meaning used here corresponding in English to management and supervision (the "cadre" is the "executive", i.e. an individual with senior managerial responsibility), but also to the action/activity of framing, as in ideological engineering and coordination. Obviously, this opens up a new area of enquiry, which is precisely where this research had led us: the "sharing economy", "commons" and "platform coopertivism" agitators, albeit with notable exceptions, appear to be spearheads of this encadrement class, spreading the word among other members of their class, consolidating deterioration of labour conditions for the working class, yet with some unavoidable "collateral damage" within their own group. 
